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Wahhabi doctrine and, in exchange, the religious leaders legitimized the continuing rule of the Saudi royal family. This royal bargain meant that the Saudis had an internal political inter- est in sustaining the religious doc- trines of the state’s religious leaders, even if they were often far more severe than mainstream Sunni Islam. As a result, Saudi Arabia became an incubator for some of the most hard- line religious practices found in the Islamic world. For a time, Saudi Arabia also pro- vided sanctuary to radical Islamic groups that were oppressed at home; in the 1960s Saudi Arabia provided a haven for leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood that were being jailed by Egyptian president Abdul Nasser. They were employed at Saudi uni- versities (they became instructors to Osama bin Laden). Given this back- ground, it should have come as no surprise that 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia. In comparison, only two of the 19 came from the UAE. The UAE political leadership did not form the same kind of bond with the clerical class in any of the emi- rates. Public opinion in the UAE would not support the creation of such a relationship, either. In his book The Mirage, Jamal Sanad al- Suwaidi, the director of the ECSSR, reports a survey conducted in the UAE during 2014 in which it was asked whether clerics should not have influence over decisions of the government. The survey found that 72.6 percent of the respondents agreed that clerics should not have such influence. By comparison, only 47 percent agreed with this proposi- tion in Saudi Arabia, and in Jordan the number was 48 percent. In short, public opinion in the UAE was strongly against the emer- gence of any form of a theocratic state, which helped put the brakes on support for radical Islamic organiza- tions. The UAE has established that the Muslim Brotherhood and its local offshoot, Islah (which means Reform), are terrorist organizations. UAE courts closed down all branch- es of the Muslim Brotherhood in early 2014. These policies have con- tributed to the strength of moderate political forces in the UAE as a whole. In contrast, Qatar permitted these groups to set up offices and even headquarters. The Taliban and Hamas had offices in Doha. What was alleged to have been an Israeli operation against a senior Hamas operative in a hotel in Dubai during 2010 was indicative of the fact that the UAE had permitted the organiza- tion to move through its territory. For a time, Hamas also engaged in fundraising in Abu Dhabi, but it did not have the infrastructure there it had become accustomed to in Qatar. The position of the UAE on the Muslim Brotherhood actually brought it into direct clashes with the movement’s local affiliate in Libya. Thus, in August 2014, UAE aircraft carried out a joint air strike with the Egyptian Air Force against a radical Islamic militia, backed by Qatar, in Libya. The UAE also conducted air strikes in Syria against radical Is- lamist groups. The UAE committed an armored brigade to the war in Yemen. These were courageous positions, for in the world of Middle East terrorism, organizations that found measures taken against them to be unacceptable were known to have retaliated in the past. While the Jan. 10, 2017 bomb attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, killing five UAE diplomats, was rel- atively recent, it can be assessed that the hard line of the UAE on jihadist groups increased the vulnerability of its representatives abroad. The attack was assumed by observers to have come out of Taliban-influenced areas of Pakistan. Prior to 9/11, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE had diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since that time, both pulled back from engaging in such close relations. I t is often forgotten, but the states along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf had significant territori- al differences in the past that have not all been resolved. The most famous of these territorial struggles was over an area known as the al- Buraymi Oasis, which is located between Oman and Abu Dhabi, but to which Saudi Arabia has also voiced its claim. In the early 1950s there was a mil- itary clash between the British-offi- cered Trucial Oman Scouts and Saudi forces. There was an interna- tional dimension to the struggle since the main oil concession in east- ern Saudi Arabia (ARAMCO) was American and the main concession in Abu Dhabi (a subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) was British. The question of territorial borders influenced the borders between oil concessions. The differences between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi were eventu- ally resolved by using territorial swaps: Abu Dhabi relinquished its claim to the Khwar Udaid inlet where the Qatari peninsula connects with the Arabian coast. But the UAE president at the time, Sheikh Zayed, had regrets over the understanding reached: the UAE lost its territorial contiguity with Qatar. Moreover, controversies over the control of the Persian Gulf seabed remained. Thus, the tensions be- tween the UAE and Saudi Arabia were not fully resolved. This led sometimes to unexpected clashes. In 2010, for example, the UAE Navy opened fire on a Saudi patrol vessel, which surrendered; its sailors were taken into custody by Abu Dhabi. Moreover, there is a perception in Abu Dhabi that it does not have the full backing of Saudi Arabia for its claims against Iran’s occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. In the last number of years, despite their outstanding differences, the two countries have grown closer, especially as they both became in- volved deeply on the same side in the Yemen civil war. The connection between the two states has been facilitated by the rise of a new gener- ation of leaders who have drawn close. Muhammad bin Zayed (born in 1961), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, reportedly has developed a strong relationship with Mohammed bin Salman (born in 1985), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia. The crown prince of Abu Dhabi has become in some respects the crown prince of Saudi Arabia’s tutor. T he greatest source of instability in the Arab Gulf states has been the matter of succession. In Qatar, the previous emir staged a coup against his father. In Oman, as well, the previous ruler, Sultan Qaboos, overthrew his father, Said bin Taimur. In the case of Abu Dhabi, while Mohammed bin Zayed is the next in line to become the UAE pres- ident, he is already assuming many of those responsibilities. His brother, Khalifa bin Zayed, the current presi- dent, suffered a stroke in January 2014, which left Mohammed bin Zayed beginning to take over many functions of the presidency. This follows a pattern that was seen in Saudi Arabia when King Fahd was incapacitated and his crown prince, Abdullah, became the effective ruler until Fahd died and then Abdullah was formally pro- moted to the throne. In the UAE case, the assumption of greater authority by Mohammed bin Zayed also placed him in a position that will be hard for other members of his family to challenge. The result of these internal developments is to provide greater stability to the UAE. A mong the Arab Gulf states, the UAE shows signs of greater sta- bility than any of its neighbors. It does not have a problem of religious extremism. It has a clear succession for the presidency. It has resolved most of its border problems with its neighbors with the exception of some minor differences at this point. It has turned its traditional rivalry with Saudi Arabia into an alliance. Above all, the restoration of American power in the Gulf region is the single most important factor in guaranteeing the stability of the UAE in the future. Dore Gold is the former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations and the current president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Stable continued from page 18 Public opinion in the UAE is strongly against a theocratic state and against radical Islamic organizations. JEWISH WORLD • OCTOBER 16-22, 2020 21 Counselor At Law / Disability Law Max D. Leifer P.C. Tel: (212)334-9699 Fax: (212)966-6544 Max D. Leifer P.C. is an established law firm with over 40 years experience in Personal Injury, Negligence, and Social Security Disability, Long-Term Disability, Commercial and Union Appeals. 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